Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decis ion of the
Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 19 January 2017,
in the following composition:
Geoff Thom ps on (England), Chairman
Johan v an Gaalen (S outh Africa), member
Wouter Lam brecht (Belgium ), member
on the claim presented by the player,
Play er A, Country B
as Claimant
against the club,
Club C, Country D
as Respondent
regarding an employment-related dispute arisen between the parties
I. Facts of the cas e
Facts related to the com petence:
1.
On 1 February 2015, the Player of Country B, Player A, (hereinafter: the Claimant)
and the Club of Country D, Club C, (hereinafter: the Respondent), signed an
employment contract (hereinafter: the contract) valid from the date of signature
until 31 May 2015.
2.
Clause O. of the contract reads:
“O. LITIGATIONS
The parties agree not to submit any litigation to the courts of justice before
exhausting all the means of the Football Federation of Country D, Professional
Football League and FIFA.”.
3.
Furthermore, Clause P. par. 3 of the contract stipulated that: “The parties
understand that this agreement is completed properly with the regulations of the
Football Federation of Country D and the Professional Football League”.
4.
In its reply to the claim, the Respondent contested that FIFA is competent to deal
with the case, stating that the Football Federation of Country D and the
Professional Football League of Country D are “functioning independent
jurisdictional commissions”, and held that according to the applicable regulations,
said bodies have “fully and exclusive competence to hear any dispute or litigation
between clubs in Country D and the players under contract with them”. In
addition, the Respondent held that “as far as committees of the Football
Federation of Country D are concerned, they meet all the requests established by
FIFA with regard to the national sportive courts”.
5.
Moreover, the Respondent also argued that, in reference to clause P. par. 3 of the
contract, if FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber would declare itself competent, it
would need to apply the Law of Country D. Moreover, the Respondent sustained
that as the contract was signed in Country D, “it is unjust that a party conduct to
be analysed through the provisions of a foreign law”.
6.
Despite being requested by FIFA, the Respondent did not provide documentation
in order to support its argumentation that the deciding body of the Football
Federation of Country D and/or Professional Football League of Country D meets
the requirements established in art. 22 lit b) of the Regulations.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
2/16
7.
The Claimant on his part, insisted on the competence of FIFA to deal with the
matter at hand and pointed out that, according to clause O. of the contract, “the
own club recognizes the FIFA as competent organization to resolve the emerging
conflicts of the contract” and that the parties “only agreed that the appeal to the
courts of justice would only be possible after exhausted the jurisdiction of sports
courts in which FIFA is included”.
Facts related to the s ubs tance of the case:
8.
According to the contract, the Claimant is entitled, inter alia, to EUR 7,000, “after
receiving the international transfer certificate”, as well as a monthly salary of EUR
7,000 net, for the period between 1 February 2015 and 31 May 2015. Moreover,
the contract established that the Claimant is entitled to “Bonuses according the
Interior Regulation”.
9.
According to the contract, “the sums shall be paid in the Currency of Country D at
the exchange rate of the National Bank of Country D on the 9th of the next
month”.
10.
On 24 May 2015, the Claimant and the Respondent signed a document titled
“Convention” (hereinafter: the first agreement), by means of which the parties
agreed that “because a better place in the ranking represents an additional
amount that will be charged with the title of TV rights, and the other point of
view, to have better performance, as well as to the game with Club E in round 33
National Football League…,…. If the above mentioned game, the Club will have a
positive result”, the Claimant was entitled to receive EUR 3,500 net, payable at the
latest on 15 July 2015.
11.
Furthermore, on 24 May 2015, the parties signed a document also titled
“Convention” (hereinafter: the second agreement), by means of which the parties
agreed that “because a better place in the ranking represents an additional
amount that will be charged with the title of TV rights, and the other point of
view, to have better performance, as well as to the game with Club F in round 34
National Football League…,…if the above mentioned game, the Club will have a
positive result”, the Claimant is entitled to receive EUR 2,000 net, payable at the
latest on 15 July 2015.
12.
By means of correspondence dated 16 June 2015, the legal representative of the
Claimant put the Respondent in default of payment of EUR 31,500, setting a time
limit of 5 days in order to remedy the default.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
3/16
13.
In this respect, by means of a letter dated 23 June 2015, the Respondent informed
the legal representative of the Claimant that “Club C will fulfil the obligation
towards your client, Player A. Therefore, by 5 July 2015, we will pay the
outstanding salaries of your client”.
14.
In reply to the Respondent’s correspondence, on 25 June 2015, the legal
representative of the Claimant informed the Respondent that he would wait for
the payment only until 5 July 2015 and instructed it to perform the remittance to
the following banking details of the Claimant:
“Account Holder. Player A
NIB: XXX
IBAN: XXX;
Swift Code: XXX;
Bank: XXX”.
15.
On 6 July 2015, the legal representative of the Claimant sent further
correspondence to the Respondent, in which he informed it that as the
Respondent had failed to pay the amount on the day promised, i.e. 5 July 2015,
but taking into account that this day fell on a Sunday, he would wait [for the
payment] “until the end of tomorrow morning”, otherwise he would refer the
case to FIFA.
16.
On 24 July 2015, subsequently amended on 25 August 2015, the Claimant lodged
a claim against the Respondent before FIFA, asking that the Respondent be
ordered to pay to him outstanding remuneration in the amount of EUR 31,500,
plus “other applicable charges, until full payment of all amounts due to player,
calculated from 16 June 2015”. The Claimant further requested sporting sanctions
to be imposed on the Respondent.
17.
The Claimant broke down his request for outstanding remuneration as follows:
18.
EUR 5,500 corresponding to the partially unpaid amount the Claimant is
entitled to after the reception of the ITC;
EUR 1,000 corresponding to the partially unpaid salary for the month of
February 2015, as the Claimant explained he received EUR 6,000 in May
2015, that according to him correspond to his salary of February 2015;
EUR 21,000 corresponding to unpaid salaries for the months of March, April
and May, all 2015;
EUR 4,000 corresponding to unpaid bonuses for the games against Club E
and Club F, in accordance with the first and second agreements.
In his claim, the Claimant explained that the Respondent has failed to pay the
amounts requested, despite that it acknowledged the debt and promised to pay
it, in accordance with the Respondent’s correspondence dated 23 June 2015.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
4/16
19.
20.
In its reply as to the substance of the Claimant’s claim, the Respondent sustained
that it paid the Claimant EUR 11,000, both in cash and via bank transfers, and not
only EUR 6,000, as stated by the Claimant.
In this respect, the Respondent provided the following detailed breakdown, which
according to it, proves the alleged payments to the Claimant:
Am ount
allegedly
paid
Date of
alleged
pay m ent
Currency of
Country D
8,854 which
according to
the
Respondent
corresponds
to approx.
EUR 2,000
18
February
2015
Currency of
Country
D
4,450 which
according to
the
Respondent
corresponds
to
approx.
EUR 1,000
5 March
2015
Currency of
Country
D
4,435 which
according to
20 April
2015
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Ex change
Rate
EUR /
Currency of
Country D
according
to the
Res pondent
on s aid
date
EUR 1 =
Currency
of
Country
D 4.45
Cas h or bank trans fer
and docum entation
prov ided in this
res pect
EUR 1 =
Currency
of
Country
D 4.44
Cash payment
EUR 1 =
Currency
of
Country
Cash Payment.
The
Respondent
provided
“payment dispositions“
number 76 and 77 in the
amounts of Currency of
Country D 4,432, and
Currency of Country D
4,422,
respectively,
allegedly signed by the
Claimant.
The
Respondent
provided
“payment
disposition“
number 107 in the
amount of Currency of
Country
D
4,450,
allegedly signed by the
Claimant.
Bank transfer
The
provided
5/16
Respondent
its account
the
Respondent
corresponds
to
approx.
EUR 1,000
D 4.43
statements as well as
payment order no. 190
to the Claimant’s bank
account opened at the
Bank of Country D, for
the amount of Currency
of Country D 4,435, in
which it is stated:
-
Beneficiary’s
name: Player A;
-
IBAN:
XXX;
Currency of
Country
D
15,606 which
according to
the
Respondent
corresponds
to
approx.
EUR 3,500
15 May
2015
EUR 1 =
Currency
of
Country
D 4.44
Beneficiary’s bank:
Bank of Country D
Bank transfer
The
Respondent
provided
its account
statements as well as
payment order no. 18 to
the
Claimant’s
bank
account opened at the
Bank of Country D, for
the amount of Currency
of Country D 15,606, in
which it is stated:
-
Beneficiary’s
name: Player A;
-
IBAN:
XXX;
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
6/16
-
Beneficiary’s bank:
Bank of Country D
-
Additional details:
“Partial Salary of
February”
Currency of
Country
D
4,500 which
according to
the
Respondent
corresponds
to
approx.
EUR 1,000
22 May
2015
Currency of
Country
D
11,147 which
according to
the
Respondent
corresponds
to
approx.
EUR 2,500
22 May
2015
EUR 1 =
Currency
of
Country
D 4.45
EUR 1 =
Currency
of
Country
D 4.45
Cash payment
The
Respondent
provided
“payment
disposition“
number 419 in the
amount of Currency of
Country
D
4,500,
allegedly signed by the
Claimant.
Bank transfer
The
Respondent
provided
its account
statements as well as
payment order no. 235
to the Claimant’s bank
account opened at the
Bank of Country D, for
the amount of Currency
of Country D 11,147, in
which it is stated:
-
Beneficiary’s
name: Player A;
-
IBAN:
-
XXX;
Beneficiary’s bank:
Bank of Country D
-
Additional details:
“Partial Salary of
February”
21.
The Respondent sustained that taking into account these payments, the claim of
the Claimant must be partially accepted.
22.
In an unsolicited correspondence dated 14 April 2016, the Respondent sustained
that it paid the Claimant Currency of Country D 131,054 on 25 November 2015,
which according to it is equivalent to EUR 29,526, via a bank transfer. The
Respondent sustained that it “was erroneously not sent until this moment”.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
7/16
23.
In his replica, the Claimant insisted on his request for relief, reiterating his initial
claim. The Claimant sustained that in accordance with the contract and the
“record results” he was entitled to 4 salaries in the amount of EUR 7,000 each, the
sign-on fee of EUR 7,000 and EUR 4,000 regarding the two match bonuses for the
matches against Club E and Club F, which amounts to EUR 39,000, and as the club
only paid EUR 7,500, there is outstanding remuneration in the total amount of
EUR 31,500.
24.
In respect, to the cash payments allegedly made by the Respondent, the Claimant
held that “The documents attached by the respondent are mechanical
reproductions, made by himself, not having the player signed any of them –
MALITA HOMINUN INFINITA, and don’t received the values in question (except of
course, the bank transfers).”.
25.
The Claimant further held that he does not recognize the payment allegedly made
on 25 November 2015. In this regard, he explained that by means of his letter
dated 25 June 2015, he had already indicated the Respondent where to deposit
the outstanding amounts, and held that he has not received any amounts there.
26.
In its duplica, the Respondent reiterated the amounts allegedly paid by it, and
upon request of FIFA, presented the alleged originals of the documents submitted
as evidence to prove the cash payments.
27.
Moreover, the Respondent submitted evidence of an alleged bank transfer made
to the Claimant on 20 November 2015, which was not enclosed originally to its
reply. Said payment is described as follows:
Am ount
allegedly
paid
Date of
alleged
pay m ent
Currency of
Country
D
131,054
which
according to
the
Respondent
20
November
2015
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
Ex change
Rate
EUR /
Currency
of Country
D
according
to the club
on s aid
date
EUR 1 =
Currency of
Country D
4.44
Cas h or bank trans fer
and docum entation
prov ided in this respect
Bank transfer
The Respondent provided
its account statements as
well as payment order no.
801 to the Claimant’s bank
account opened at the
8/16
corresponds
to
approx.
EUR 29,500
Bank of Country D, for the
amount of Currency of
Country D 131,054, in
which it is stated:
-
Beneficiary’s
Player A;
-
IBAN:
name:
XXX;
-
28.
Beneficiary’s
bank:
Bank of Country D
In respect to the payment allegedly made on 20 November 2015, the Claimant
held that it is contradictory to what was initially sustained by the Respondent in
its unsolicited correspondence, as it originally claimed that the payment was made
on 25 November 2015. In consequence, the Claimant reiterated his request for
relief in full, and sustained that the Respondent is trying to demonstrate that it
paid amounts to him, when in fact it did not.
II. Cons iderations of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
1.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: also referred to as
Chamber or DRC) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at
hand. In this respect, it took note that the present matter was submitted to FIFA
on 24 July 2015. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the 2015 edition of
the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee and the
Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter: the Procedural Rules) is applicable to the
matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the 2015 edition of the Procedural Rules).
2.
Subsequently, the members of the Chamber referred to art. 3 of the Procedural
Rules and confirmed that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and par. 2 in
combination with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of
Players (edition 2016) the Dispute Resolution Chamber would, in principle, be
competent to deal with the matter at stake, which concerns an employmentrelated dispute with an international dimension between a Player of Country B
and a Club of Country D.
3.
However, the Chamber acknowledged that the Respondent contested the
competence of FIFA’s deciding bodies on the basis of the alleged fact that the
Football Federation of Country D and the Professional Football League of Country
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
9/16
D have “fully and exclusive competence to hear any dispute or litigation between
clubs in Country D and the players under contract with them”. The DRC took note
that the Respondent held that the Football Federation of Country D and the
Professional Football League of Country D are “functioning independent
jurisdictional commissions”, and that “as far as the Football Federation of Country
D committees are concerned, they meet all the requests established by FIFA with
regard to the national sportive courts”.
4.
Moreover, it was further noted that the Respondent also argued that, in
accordance with clause P. par. 3 of the contract and since the contract was signed
in Country D, if FIFA’s Dispute Resolution Chamber would declare itself competent,
it would need to apply the Law of Country D and that “it is unjust that a party
conduct to be analysed through the provisions of a foreign law”.
5.
In this regard, the members of the Chamber noted that the Claimant rejected such
position and insisted that FIFA is competent to deal with the present matter
highlighting, inter alia, that article O. of the contract provided, among other
things, for FIFA’s competence in case of disputes arising out of the contract.
6.
Taking into account all the above, the Chamber emphasised that in accordance
with art. 22 lit. b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, it is
competent to deal with a matter such as the one at hand, unless an independent
arbitration tribunal, guaranteeing fair proceedings and respecting the principle of
equal representation of players and clubs, has been established at national level
within the framework of the association and/or a collective bargaining agreement.
With regard to the standards to be imposed on an independent arbitration
tribunal guaranteeing fair proceedings, the members of the Chamber referred to
the FIFA Circular no. 1010 dated 20 December 2005. Equally, the Chamber referred
to the principles contained in the FIFA National Dispute Resolution Chamber
(NDRC) Standard Regulations, which came into force on 1 January 2008.
7.
While analysing whether it was competent to hear the present matter, the Dispute
Resolution Chamber considered that it should, first and foremost, analyse whether
the employment contract at the basis of the present dispute actually contained a
jurisdiction clause.
8.
Having said this, the members of the Chamber turned their attention to art. O of
the contract, which stipulates that “The parties agree not to submit any litigation
to the courts of justice before exhausting all the means of the Football Federation
of Country D, the Professional Football League and FIFA.”.
9.
In view of the aforementioned clause, the members of the DRC were of the
opinion that art. O of the employment contract does not make clear reference to
one specific national dispute resolution chamber in the sense of art. 22 lit. b) of
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
10/16
the aforementioned Regulations and even provides for the possibility of lodging a
contractual dispute in front of FIFA. Therefore, the members of the Chamber deem
that said clause can by no means be considered as a clear arbitration clause in
favour either of the national deciding bodies, i.e. of the Football Federation of
Country D and/or Professional Football League of Country D, and, therefore,
cannot be applicable. In this regard, the Chamber pointed out that this lack of
clarity is also reflected in the Respondent’s argumentation, since it did not specify
which specific national body would be competent.
10.
Having established that the first criterion for the recognition of the competence of
a national decision-making body is not fulfilled in the present matter, the
Chamber deemed unnecessary to examine any further points which would need to
be assessed before concluding to the competence of a national deciding body.
11.
Furthermore, with respect to the Respondent’s argument that FIFA’s DRC has to
apply the Law of Country D in view of the content of clause P. par. 3 of the
contract, the members of the DRC recalled that said clause stipulated “The parties
understand that this agreement is completed properly with the regulations of the
Football Federation of Country D and Professional Football League” and in
consequence, wished to point out that said clause cannot be interpreted as a
choice of law between the parties, particularly, it cannot be considered that the
parties chose the Law of Country D to be applicable, since said clause does not
contain any reference to it. Moreover, the DRC emphasised that when deciding a
dispute before the DRC, FIFA’s regulations prevail over any national law chosen by
the parties. In this regard, the Chamber emphasized that the main objective of the
FIFA regulations is to create a standard set of rules which all the actors within the
football community are subject to and can rely on. This objective would not be
achievable if the DRC would have to apply the national law of a specific party on
every dispute brought to it. Therefore, the Chamber deems that it is not
appropriate to primarily apply the principles of a particular national law to a
dispute brought to its analysis but rather the Regulations, general principles of law
and, where existing, the Chamber’s well-established jurisprudence.
12.
In view of all the aforementioned circumstances, the Chamber established that the
Respondent’s objections to the competence of FIFA to deal with the present
matter had to be rejected and that the DRC is competent, on the basis of art. 22 lit.
b) of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, to consider the present
matter as to the substance.
13.
Subsequently, the Chamber analysed which regulations should be applicable as to
the substance of the matter. In this respect, it confirmed that in accordance with
art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players
(editions 2015 and 2016), and considering that the present claim was lodged on 24
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
11/16
July 2015, the 2015 edition of said regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is
applicable to the matter at hand as to the substance.
14.
The competence of the Chamber and the applicable regulations having been
established, the Chamber entered into the substance of the matter. In this respect,
the Chamber started by acknowledging all the above-mentioned facts as well as
the arguments and the documentation submitted by the parties. However, the
Chamber emphasised that in the following considerations it will refer only to the
facts, arguments and documentary evidence, which it considered pertinent for the
assessment of the matter at hand.
15.
In this respect, the Chamber acknowledged that on 1 February 2015, the parties
signed an employment contract valid between the date of signature and 31 May
2015. In accordance with said contract, the player was entitled to receive, inter
alia, EUR 7,000, “after receiving the international transfer certificate”, as well as a
monthly salary of EUR 7,000. The DRC further noted that, on 24 May 2015, the
parties signed two agreements, which established bonus payments of EUR 3,500
and EUR 2,000, respectively, both payable in the scenario that “If the above
mentioned game, the Club will have a positive result” (cf. points I./10. and I./11.
Above) to the Claimant at the latest on 15 July 2015.
16.
In continuation, the members of the Chamber noted that the Claimant, on 16 June
2015, put the Respondent in default of payment of EUR 31,500. In this regard, the
Chamber observed that, on 23 June 2015, the Respondent replied to the Claimant
and informed him that it would proceed with such payment by 5 July 2015.
17.
Furthermore, the DRC highlighted that it remained uncontested that, on 25 June
2015, the legal representative of the Claimant informed the Respondent about the
Claimant’s banking details (cf. point I.14. above) and that it would wait until the
date proposed by the Respondent for payment. Along this line, the Chamber took
note that the Claimant held that as from this moment he did not receive any
amounts from the Respondent.
18.
In this context, the members of the DRC analysed the claim lodged by the
Claimant, and underlined that the Claimant held that he only received EUR 7,500
from the Respondent, whereas, allegedly, he was entitled to receive EUR 39,000
from it for the duration of the contract. According to the Claimant, the amount he
was allegedly entitled to is composed by a sign-on fee of EUR 7,000, four monthly
salaries of EUR 7,000 and match bonuses of EUR 4,000.
19.
In respect to the claimed bonuses, taking into account the documentation
presented by the Claimant in support of his petition, the DRC concluded that the
Claimant had not fully substantiated his claim with pertinent documentary
evidence in accordance with art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules. That is, there is
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
12/16
no supporting documentation relating to the Claimant’s claim pertaining to the
scenarios stipulated i.e. “If the above mentioned game, the Club will have a
positive result” in respect to the bonuses. Consequently, the DRC concluded that
EUR 35,000 is the amount that the Claimant could prove he was entitled to.
20.
Equally, the members of the Chamber took note of the reply of the Respondent, in
which it first asserted that it had already paid the Claimant the total amount of
EUR 11,000. In this respect, the Respondent submitted various payment receipts
and bank statements (cf. point I./20. above).
21.
With due consideration to the above, the members of the Chamber took into
account that from the EUR 11,000 allegedly paid by the Respondent, the Claimant
did not contest the bank transfers that add up to EUR 7,000, but contested and
rejected the alleged cash payments that amount to EUR 4,000, as the Claimant
held that he did not receive the cash payments and he did not sign the
corresponding cash receipts.
22.
It was further noted, that upon FIFA’s request, the Respondent provided the
original versions of the contested payment receipts.
23.
At this stage, the DRC considered it appropriate to remark that, as a general rule,
FIFA's deciding bodies are not competent to decide upon matters of criminal law,
such as the ones of alleged falsified signature or document, and that such affairs
fall into the jurisdiction of the competent national criminal authority.
24.
In continuation, the DRC recalled that, according to art. 12 par. 6 of the Procedural
Rules, all documentation remitted shall be considered with free discretion and,
therefore, the Chamber focused its attention on the alleged original versions of
the payment receipts provided as well as on the other documents containing the
signature of the Claimant and submitted by the parties in the context of the
present dispute.
25.
After a thorough analysis of the aforementioned documents, in particular,
comparing the relevant signatures of the Claimant in the original versions of the
payment receipts and the signatures of the Claimant in the various documents
provided in the present affair, the Chamber had no other option but to conclude
that, for a layman, the signatures on such documents appear to be alike and
genuine.
26.
In view of the above, the DRC came to the conclusion that the cash payments
amounting to EUR 4,000, as well as the EUR 7,000 corresponding to bank transfers
are therefore to be taken into account as payments to the Claimant in the total
amount of EUR 11,000.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
13/16
27.
Subsequently, the members of the DRC turned their attention to the Respondent’s
assertion that it paid a further EUR 29,500 to the Claimant on 25 November 2015,
via bank transfer. In this regard, the DRC took note that with its duplica, the
Respondent submitted evidence of a bank transfer to the Claimant’s bank account
in Country D allegedly executed on 20 November 2015 corresponding to the above
mentioned amount (cf. point I./27. above).
28.
In this respect, the Chamber highlighted that the Claimant sustained not having
received said payment.
29.
Along these lines, the Chamber wished to recall that it remains uncontested that in
reply to the Respondent informing the Claimant that it would pay the outstanding
amount by 5 July 2015, the Claimant duly notified the Respondent of his new
banking details in Country B since 25 June 2015, explicitly requesting to be paid in
this bank account.
30.
Consequently, the DRC considered that the payment at stake was made to the
Claimant’s former bank account in Country D, 5 months after the Respondent was
duly instructed to pay the Claimant in his new bank account in Country B.
31.
As a result, the members of the Chamber were of the opinion that the Respondent
has to bear the consequences of the fact that it wrongfully used the Claimant’s
former bank account details, without a contractual clause obliging it to pay in said
former account.
32.
In view of all the above, the members of the Chamber concluded that the
Respondent could prove at the Chamber’s satisfaction, that it paid the Claimant
the total amount of EUR 11,000.
33.
As a result thereof, the Chamber established that the Respondent had failed to
pay to the Claimant the amount of EUR 24,000, in relation to the sign-on fee and
salary payments under the contract concluded between the parties for the period
between 1 February 2015 and 31 May 2015.
34.
Consequently, and in accordance with the general legal principle of pacta sunt
servanda, the Respondent must fulfil its obligations as per the contract concluded
with the Claimant and, therefore, is to be held liable to pay the outstanding
amount of EUR 24,000 to the Claimant.
35.
In addition, the Chamber analysed the Claimants request for “other applicable
charges, until full payment of all amounts due to player, calculated from 16 June
2015” and decided that as said request cannot be construed as a request for
interest, it therefore lacks legal basis.
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
14/16
36.
Finally, the Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present matter by
establishing that any further claim lodged by the player is rejected.
III.
Decis ion of the Dis pute Res olution Cham ber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is admissible.
2.
The claim of the Claimant is partially accepted.
3.
The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant w ithin 30 day s as from the
date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the amount of
EUR 24,000.
4.
In the event that the aforementioned sum is not paid by the Respondent within
the stated time limit, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall due as of expiry of the
aforementioned time limit and the present matter shall be submitted, upon
request, to FIFA’s Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision
5.
Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
6.
The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of the
account number to which the remittance is to be made and to notify the Dispute
Resolution Chamber of every payment received.
*****
Note relating to the m otiv ated decis ion (legal remedy):
According to art. 58 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed against
before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal must be sent
to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this decision and shall
contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the directives issued by the CAS, a
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10 days following the expiry of the
time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file a brief stating the
facts and legal arguments giving rise to the appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the
directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
_____________________________
Marco Villiger
Deputy Secretary General
Encl: CAS directives
Player A, Country B / Club C, Country D
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