Labour Disputes
Texto da decisão
Decision of the
Dispute Resolution Chamber
passed in Zurich, Switzerland, on 28 January 2016,
in the following composition:
Geoff Thompson (England), Chairman
Theodore Giannikos (Greece), member
Theo van Seggelen (The Netherlands), member
on the claim presented by the player,
Player A, country B,
as Claimant
against the club,
Club C, country D
as Respondent
regarding an employment-related dispute between the parties
I.
Facts of the case
1.
On 9 November 2012, the player from country B, Player A (hereinafter: the
Claimant) and the club from country D, Club C (hereinafter: the Respondent),
concluded an employment contract (hereinafter: the contract), valid as of 1
January 2013 until 31 December 2014. Nevertheless, art. 2 par. 2 of the contract
provided that “[the Claimant] hereby agrees, following an agreement between
the parties, to grant [the Respondent] the right to extend the duration of this
contract, upon request, for one more sports season – 2015 sports season – until
31st December 2015”.
2.
Pursuant to art. 3 of the contract, the Claimant was entitled to receive the
following net remuneration:
- For the 2013 season: the equivalent in the currency of country D of USD
81,000 payable in 12 equal monthly instalments of the equivalent in the
currency of country D of USD 6,750 on the 10th day of the month, the first
instalment being due on 10 February 2013;
- For the 2014 season: the equivalent in the currency of country D of USD
81,000 payable in 12 equal monthly instalments of the equivalent in the
currency of country D of USD 6,750 on the 10th day of the month, the first
instalment being due on 10 February “2013”;
3.
In addition, art. 4 of the contract stipulated that the Claimant was entitled to
receive the equivalent in the currency of country D of USD 150,000 per season as
an “extraordinary award for the signing of this contract and image rights” as
follows:
- For the 2013 season:
o USD 50,000 “up to 1 month following the signing of the contract”;
o USD 50,000 before 30 January 2013;
o USD 50,000 before 30 May 2013;
- For the 2014 season:
o USD 50,000 before January 2014;
o USD 50,000 before 30 May 2014;
o USD 50,000 before 30 August 2014.
4.
Furthermore, art. 10 of the contract read as follows:
“1. If one of the parties terminates this contract, alleging just cause and the
competent court fails to recognise its existence, it will indemnify the other party
for damages caused by illicit conduct. The amount payable as indemnity is
hereby established, under the penalty clause:
a) If the [Respondent] terminates the contract illicitly, it is obliged to pay
the [Claimant] the equivalent of all payment maturing before the end of
the contract in the form of indemnity. However, it deduct the indemnity
from the amounts the latter receives from supplying the same activity to
another sports entity during the period equivalent to the terminated
Player A, country B / Club C, country D
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contract timeframe without being owed any other indemnity of any
nature;
b) If the [Claimant] illicitly terminates the contract, it is obliged, under
labour-legal framework, to pay the [Respondent] indemnity, registered
by a third independent Club, on the legal-sports framework, equal to
payments receivable before the end of the terminated contract of USD
500,000.00 (Five hundred thousand American dollars). This corresponds to
valuation of the [Claimant]’s sports participation rights performed by the
Parties in this contract”.
5.
On 12 February 2014, the Claimant and the Respondent signed a termination
agreement by means of which the parties “intend to fully revoke the sports
contract (…) as from 25th June 2013”.
6.
According to clause 3 of the termination agreement, the Respondent undertook
to pay the Claimant the equivalent in the currency of country D of USD
26,666.66 as compensation for the termination. Clause 5 of the termination
agreement further specified that “the Parties mutually release themselves from
all rights, duties and obligations under the sports contract revoked herein and
the [Claimant] declares that it is only owed by the [Respondent] the amount
mentioned in Clause Three above as payments, premiums, subsidies, expenses,
subsistence allowances or any other costs”.
7.
Moreover, clause 6 of the termination agreement provided that “the parties
expressly and irrevocably agree to condition the validity of the termination of
this contract to the verification of the signing of the sports contract by the
[Claimant] with Club E and its effective registration with the Football Federation
of country D, for the purpose of participating in competitions organised by the
latter as from February 2014, in representation of said Club. It is hereby
established that the termination agreed upon herein will not come into effect
should the [Claimant] not actually be registered pursuant to the terms indicated
above, this restoring the legal effects of the sports contract now terminated”.
8.
On 7 March 2014, the Respondent allowed the Claimant to leave the country
and miss training sessions until 15 April 2014. The Respondent further expressed
in the relevant document, that failure to return on the set date would subject
the Claimant “to the disciplinary sanctions set forth in the [Respondent’s]
Internal Regulation, in the respective Sports Contract, or others applicable
pursuant to the law”.
9.
On 10 April 2014, the Claimant put the Respondent in default of paying his
salaries for January, February and March 2014 as well as the instalment
equivalent to USD 50,000, due in January 2014, giving the Respondent a
deadline of five days to proceed to the payment.
Player A, country B / Club C, country D
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10. On 15 April 2014, the Respondent replied acknowledging that the Claimant had
signed an employment agreement with Club E. Furthermore, the Respondent
stressed that the amount of USD 35,000 was paid to the Claimant’s account.
11. On 21 April 2014, the Claimant replied to the Respondent’s communication,
asserting that in accordance with clause 6 of the termination agreement, the
latter did not come into force since the Claimant had never been registered
with Club E. In addition, the Claimant stated that the amount in the currency of
country D equivalent to USD 26,666.66 agreed upon clause 3 of the termination
agreement “corresponds to 2013 season salaries and game prizes and has
nothing to do with contract prices foreseen for 2014, which are all pending
payment”.
12. On 28 April 2014, the Claimant terminated the contract in writing.
13. On 22 January 2015, the Claimant lodged a claim against the Respondent in
front of FIFA for breach of contract, requesting to be awarded with the
following amounts:
- USD 20,250 as outstanding salaries for the period as of January until March
2014;
- USD 50,000 as the sign-on fee foreseen in art. 4 of the contract payable in
January 2014;
- USD 500,000 as compensation for the breach of contract in accordance with
art. 10 of the contract;
- USD 391,750 as subsidiary compensation, corresponding to the remaining 21
monthly salaries of USD 6,750 each, as of April 2014 until December 2015,
and 5 instalments of USD 50,000 for the sign-on fee according to clause 4 of
the contract;
- 5% interest on the above-mentioned amounts “from the date in which the
amounts became due”;
- Legal costs.
14. In his claim, the Claimant explained that his eventual signing for Club E finally
did not occur because he did not obtain the nationality of country D and,
therefore, the termination agreement never came into force. Consequently, the
contract with the Respondent remained valid and effective. In this regard, the
Claimant provided an e-mail sent, on 11 July 2014, by the Football Association
of country D to the Football Association of country B where it was stated that
the Claimant was never registered with Club E. In this context, the Claimant
referred to the authorization given by the Respondent to him on 7 March 2014
to leave the country, as a proof that the Respondent considered the contract to
be in force, as such authorization stated that the failure of the Claimant to
return to the Respondent would result in disciplinary sanctions.
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15. In its reply to the Claimant’s claim, the Respondent rejected the allegations of
the Claimant and firstly declared that it only received the termination letter, via
the Football Association of country D, on 11 June 2014 to which it replied on 17
June 2014 opposing itself to the termination of the Claimant. According to the
Respondent, the Claimant initiated disciplinary proceedings within the Football
Federation of country D and “the procedure is pending and awaiting final
decision”. Moreover, the Respondent stressed that the term of the contract was
until 31 December 2014, and, therefore, the subsidiary compensation would not
be due as requested by the Claimant, in the sense that the extension was an
option that was supposed to be exercised under both parties’ agreement.
16. In continuation, the Respondent outlined that the official release No. XXXXXX,
of 28 February 2014, of the Football Federation of country D, which was
provided by the Respondent, stated that the Claimant was effectively registered
for Club E. In this respect, the Respondent declared that the Claimant signed an
employment contract with Club E but then “was unable to represent” the latter
for reasons not attributable to the Respondent itself. Based on the
aforementioned, the Respondent stated that it considered the contract with the
Claimant terminated as per the termination agreement signed on 12 February
2014, as the conditions had been met and the Respondent had paid the amount
therein provided.
17. Moreover, the Respondent highlighted that the signature of its General
Manager in the authorization dated 7 March 2014 was forged. The Respondent
expressed that his General Manager would not sign a document only with the
abbreviated form of his signature and that this is the indication that such
signature was placed there. In this respect, the Respondent stated that its
lawyer sent the relevant authorization, not signed, by e-mail to the Claimant,
because apparently the latter was going to seek the signature of the General
Manager, which he never did according to the Respondent.
18. Furthermore, the Respondent provided a statement of the Sporting Technical
Committee (hereinafter: STC) of the Football Federation of country D, dated 4
March 2015 (hereinafter: Statement of the STC), where it was declared that the
aforementioned committee did not approve the registration of the Claimant for
Club E due to the non-compliance, by the latter, of certain administrative steps,
i.e. failure of Club E to provide certain requested documentation. Furthermore,
the Statement of the STC, in its paragraph 6, reads as follows: “we hereby
CERTIFY that [the Respondent], […], does not hold any sporting commitment to
[the Claimant], with whom it rescinded the contractual link as of 12 February
2014”.
19. Based on the above-mentioned Statement of the STC, the Respondent
maintained that the registration of the Claimant with Club E was completed, as
all the steps were undertaken, and the later suspension of the registration was
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caused by the Claimant’s actions only, which cannot be used against the
Respondent. In this regard, the Respondent reiterated that the Claimant did not
have a valid employment relationship with the Respondent anymore due to the
fact that he signed a termination agreement with the Respondent as well as an
employment contract with Club E valid as of 1 January 2014 until 31 December
2014. Additionally, the Respondent stressed that there cannot exist two valid
contracts for the same term, thus concluding that the contract between itself
and the Claimant was terminated by mutual consent on 12 February 2014, being
the contract between the Claimant and Club E the only valid one for the
relevant period.
20. In his replica, the Claimant maintained the statements of his initial claim and
emphasized the conditions contained in the termination agreement, alleging
that all parties were aware of the difficulties the Claimant would have in
obtaining the nationality of country D and that, for this reason, the two
conditions were inserted in the termination agreement. In this regard, the
Claimant highlighted that the validity of the termination agreement was made
subject to two conditions and that only one was met i.e. the signing of the
employment contract with Club E, as the Football Association of country D did
not approve his registration with Club E due to the defective documentation
submitted by the latter.
21. As to the allegation of the Respondent with regards to the authorization dated
7 March 2014, the Claimant asserted that such document was first sent to him
by the Respondent’s lawyer by e-mail and, thereafter, “handed to the Claimant,
duly signed and stamped, by a representative of the [Respondent]”. To this end
and after having been requested by FIFA to provide the original authorization,
the Claimant declared that the original was sent by registered mail with his
statement of claim.
22. In its duplica, the Respondent highlighted the fact that the Claimant did
recognize having signed an employment agreement with Club E. In this line of
argumentation, the Respondent stressed that the Football Federation of country
D never issued an official communication stating the invalidity of the Claimant’s
registration with Club E. Therefore, the Respondent considered the conditions
of the termination agreement fulfilled and considered the Claimant duly
registered with Club E.
23. Moreover, the Respondent invoked that the acquisition of the nationality of
country D was not one of the conditions included in the termination agreement
signed by the Respondent and the Claimant. According to the Respondent, the
arguments held by the Football Federation of country D for the invalidity of the
Claimant’s registration with Club E were based on the misrepresentation of the
Claimant’s nationality.
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24. Finally, the Respondent reiterated that the signature of its General Manager in
the authorization dated 7 March 2014 was forged and that the person who sent
the document, the Respondent’s lawyer Mr. F, was not an employee nor a
representative of the Respondent and that said person acted in good faith upon
request of the Claimant.
25. Upon request of FIFA, the Claimant informed that he did not sign a new
employment contract with any other club.
II. Considerations of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
First of all, the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter also referred to as DRC
or Chamber) analysed whether it was competent to deal with the matter at
stake. In this respect, the DRC took note that the present matter was submitted
to FIFA on 22 January 2015. Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the
2014 edition of the Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status
Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber (hereinafter the Procedural
Rules) is applicable to the matter at hand (cf. art. 21 of the Procedural Rules).
2.
Subsequently, the DRC referred to art. 3 of the Procedural Rules and confirmed
that in accordance with art. 24 par. 1 and 2 in combination with art. 22 lit. b) of
the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2015) the DRC
would, in principle, be competent to deal with the matter at stake, which
concerns an employment-related dispute with an international dimension
between a player from country B and an club from country D.
3.
The competence of the Chamber having been established, the Chamber
analysed which edition of the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players
should be applicable as to the substance of the matter. In this respect, it
confirmed that, in accordance with art. 26 par. 1 and 2 of the Regulations on
the Status and Transfer of Players (edition 2014), and considering that the
present matter was submitted to FIFA on 22 January 2015, the 2014 edition of
the aforementioned regulations (hereinafter: the Regulations) is applicable to
the matter at hand as to the substance.
4.
Having established the foregoing, and entering into the substance of the
matter, the Chamber continued by acknowledging the afore-mentioned facts as
well as the documentation contained in the file in relation to the substance of
the matter. The Chamber, however, emphasised that in the following
considerations it will refer only to the facts, arguments and documentary
evidence which it considered pertinent for the assessment of the matter at
hand.
5.
In this respect, the Chamber acknowledged that on 9 November 2012, the
Claimant and the Respondent had signed an employment contract valid as of 1
January 2013 until 31 December 2014, by means of which the parties agreed
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inter alia upon the Claimant receiving each season the amount of USD 81,000 as
salary and USD 150,000 as an “extraordinary award for the signing of this
contract and image rights”. The DRC also observed that the contract provided
an option for the extension of the contract until 31 December 2015 “following
an agreement between the parties”.
6.
The Chamber further acknowledged that, on 12 February 2014, both parties
signed a termination agreement in accordance with which the Respondent
would pay the amount of USD 26,666.66 to the Claimant. In this regard, the
Chamber considered convenient to highlight the contents of clause 6 of said
termination agreement which provided that: “the parties expressly and
irrevocably agree to condition the validity of the termination of this contract to
the verification of the signing of the sports contract by the [Claimant] with Club
E and its effective registration with the Football Federation of country D, for the
purpose of participating in competitions organised by the latter as from
February 2014, in representation of said Club. It is hereby established that the
termination agreed upon herein will not come into effect should the [Claimant]
not actually be registered pursuant to the terms indicated above, this restoring
the legal effects of the sports contract now terminated”.
7.
In continuation, the Chamber noted that the Claimant maintained that, even
though he signed an employment contract with Club E, he was never registered
with the latter and that, as such, the Respondent was to be held liable for the
early termination of the contract by having failed to fulfil the obligations of the
valid employment contract between the parties. More specifically, the Claimant
pointed out that the Respondent failed to pay his remuneration and did not
demonstrate any interest in re-incorporating the Claimant to the team.
8.
In this respect, the members of the Chamber took note of the Claimant’s default
notice dated 10 April 2014 addressed to the Respondent by means of which the
Claimant informed the Respondent of the lack of fulfilment of its financial
duties. The DRC also observed that the relevant default notice was answered by
the Respondent, acknowledging the signature of a new employment agreement
with Club E.
9.
At this stage, the members of the DRC turned their attention to the Claimant’s
communication of 21 April 2014 in which the Claimant notified the Respondent
that he was never registered with Club E in the Football Federation of country D
and, therefore, the termination agreement never came into force since one of
the conditions was never fulfilled. The Chamber also took note of the notice of
termination dated on 28 April 2014, by means of which the Claimant terminated
the contract with the Respondent.
10. From the outset, the members of the Chamber emphasized that the central
issue of the present dispute was whether the contract was indeed terminated by
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the signing of the termination agreement or, on the contrary, if it was breached
by any of the parties to the dispute, in which case the DRC would have to
determine which party is to be held liable for the breach.
11. Indeed, the Chamber noted that, according to the Respondent, as opposed to
the Claimant, the contract had come to an end by means of the termination
agreement since the Claimant signed a new employment contract with the club,
Club E, and the Claimant was registered with the Football Federation of country
D as a player of Club E. In this regard, the Respondent provided the official
release No. XXXXXXX, of 28 February 2014, of the Football Federation of
country D in which it was stated that the Claimant was transferred from the
Respondent to Club E.
12. Nevertheless, the members of the Chamber observed that the Respondent itself
provided the STC Statement that clearly showed that the Football Federation of
country D did not approve the registration of the Claimant with Club E due to
administrative issues (point I. 18 and I. 19 above).
13. In this respect and bearing in mind art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules, in
accordance with which any party claiming a right on the basis of an alleged fact
shall carry the burden of proof, the Chamber was eager to point out that the
Respondent had failed to present conclusive documentation in support of its
position. In particular, the members of the Chamber ascertained that the
Respondent was not able to corroborate that the Claimant was effectively
registered under the Football Federation of country D with Club E, as the
Respondent alleged he was. As a consequence, the Chamber concluded that the
Respondent had not presented decisive evidence proving the existence of said
registration and unanimously concluded that the argument of the Respondent
in this regard could not be upheld.
14. The DRC then recalled that the player communicated to the Respondent that
the conditions of termination agreement were not fulfilled, a communication
the Respondent ignored. Furthermore, the Chamber recalled that the
Respondent acknowledged that the Claimant was never registered in the
Football Federation of country D with Club E in its final comments.
15. In continuation, the Chamber focused on the authorisation dated 7 March 2014
in which the Respondent apparently allowed the Claimant to leave the country
and to miss the Respondent’s training sessions. In this regard and, without
entering into the question as to whether the signature contained in this
authorisation was forged or not, the Chamber highlighted that the Respondent
acknowledged that its lawyer sent said authorisation to the Claimant for the
latter to have it signed by the Respondent’s General Manager. In this respect,
the members of the Chamber were of the opinion that the Respondent, by
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issuing such authorisation and sending it to the Claimant, acknowledged that
the employment relationship between both parties was still running.
16. As a consequence, the members of the Chamber determined that one of the
conditions established in the termination agreement was not fulfilled since the
Claimant was not duly registered with the Football Federation of country D with
Club E. In this respect, the DRC concluded that the termination agreement was
neither valid, nor applicable and, therefore, that the employment contract
between the parties remained valid after 12 February 2014.
17. Having stated the above, the members of the Chamber then highlighted that,
considering the claim and the arguments of the parties, they further had to
determine whether the employment contract had been terminated with or
without just cause and, which party was responsible for the early termination of
the contractual relationship in question.
18. In doing so, the Chamber recalled that, according to the Claimant, his salaries
for January until March 2014 had remained unpaid and also that the instalment
due in January 2014 had not been paid by the Respondent. The DRC noted in
this regard that the Respondent did not contest such particular allegations.
19. Moreover, the DRC took note of the default notice sent by the Claimant and the
following exchange of correspondence between the parties in April 2014 (cf.
points I. 9, 10 and 11 above). The members of the Chamber further emphasised
that the Respondent declared having paid the amount of USD 35,000 to the
Claimant and that the latter, in this respect, alleged in his notification dated 20
April 2014 that such amount corresponded to the salaries for season 2013,
which was not contested by the Respondent.
20. Having taken into account the previous considerations, the Chamber decided
that it could be established that the Respondent had neglected its contractual
obligations towards the Claimant, i.e. the Respondent had failed to remunerate
the Claimant for several concepts for a substantial period of time. Therefore,
the Chamber considered that the Respondent was found to be in breach of the
employment contract and that the breach was of such seriousness that, in line
with the Chamber’s long-standing and well-established jurisprudence, the
Claimant had a just cause to terminate the contractual relationship with the
Respondent on 28 April 2014 and, consequently, the Respondent is to be held
liable for the early termination of the employment contact.
21. Bearing in mind the previous considerations, the Chamber went on to deal with
the consequences of the early termination of the employment contract with just
cause by the Claimant.
Player A, country B / Club C, country D
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22. First of all, the members of the Chamber concurred that the Respondent must
fulfil its obligations as per the employment contract in accordance with the
general legal principle of “pacta sunt servanda”. Consequently, the Chamber
decided that the Respondent is liable to pay to the Claimant the remuneration
that was outstanding at the time of the termination i.e. the amount of USD
77,000 corresponding to his salaries from January to April 2014 in the amount of
USD 27,000 and the amount of USD 50,000 for the sign-on fee due in January
2014.
23. Furthermore, taking into account the Claimant’s request as well as the constant
practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber in this regard, the Chamber decided
that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on the
amount of USD 77,000 as follows:
5% p.a. as of 1 February 2014 on the amount of USD 50,000;
5% p.a. as of 11 February 2014 on the amount of USD 6,750;
5% p.a. as of 11 March 2014 on the amount of USD 6,750;
5% p.a. as of 11 April 2014 on the amount of USD 6,750;
5% p.a. as of 11 May 2014 on the amount of USD 6,750.
24. In continuation, the Chamber focused its attention on the calculation of the
amount of compensation for breach of contract in the matter at stake. In doing
so, the members of the Chamber firstly recapitulated that, in accordance with
art. 17 par. 1 of the Regulations, the amount of compensation shall be
calculated, in particular and unless otherwise provided for in the contract at the
basis of the dispute, with due consideration for the law of the country
concerned, the specificity of sport and further objective criteria, including, in
particular, the remuneration and other benefits due to the Claimant under the
existing contract and/or the new contract, the time remaining on the existing
contract up to a maximum of five years, and depending on whether the
contractual breach falls within the protected period.
25. In application of the relevant provision, the Chamber held that it first of all had
to clarify whether the pertinent employment contract contains a provision by
means of which the parties had beforehand agreed upon an amount of
compensation payable by the contractual parties in the event of breach of
contract. In this regard, the Chamber recalled that according to art. 10 of the
contract: “If one of the parties terminates this contract, alleging just cause and
the competent court fails to recognise its existence, it will indemnify the other
party for damages caused by illicit conduct. The amount payable as indemnity is
hereby established, under the penalty clause:
-
If the [Respondent] terminates the contract illicitly, it is obliged to pay the
[Claimant] the equivalent of all payment maturing before the end of the
contract in the form of indemnity. However, it deduct the indemnity from
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-
the amounts the latter receives from supplying the same activity to
another sports entity during the period equivalent to the terminated
contract timeframe without being owed any other indemnity of any
nature;
If the [Claimant] illicitly terminates the contract, it is obliged, under
labour-legal framework, to pay the [Respondent] indemnity, registered by
a third independent Club, on the legal-sports framework, equal to
payments receivable before the end of the terminated contract of USD
500,000.00 (Five hundred thousand American dollars). This corresponds to
valuation of the [Claimant]’s sports participation rights performed by the
Parties in this contract”.
26. The members of the Chamber agreed that this clause is to the benefit of the
Respondent only, i.e. it does not grant the same rights to the Claimant as to the
Respondent. For the sake of completeness, the DRC took due note that the
Claimant applied an analogy of this article to his benefit by claiming USD
500,000 as compensation for breach of contract in his initial claim and not the
rights that would be applicable to the Claimant as per such clause. The DRC
therefore determined that said clause cannot be taken into consideration in the
determination of the amount of compensation.
27. Having recalled the aforementioned, and in order to evaluate the compensation
to be paid by the Respondent, the members of the Chamber referred to its wellestablished jurisprudence, taking into account the remuneration due to the
Claimant in accordance with the employment contract as well as the time
remaining on the same contract, along with the professional situation of the
Claimant after the early termination occurred. In this respect, the members of
the Chamber pointed out that the Claimant based his claim for compensation
for breach of contract on a period as from April 2014 until 31 December 2015. In
this regard, the DRC observed that the initial term of the contract was set until
31 December 2014 and that there was an option for the extension of the
contract until 31 December 2015 “following an agreement between the parties”
(cf. point I. 1 and II. 5 above). In this regard, the DRC recalled that this alleged
extension was disputed by the Respondent. As a consequence, and in the
absence of any documentary evidence from the Claimant to prove that there
was an agreement concluded between the parties in order to extend the
contract until 31 December 2015 (cf. art. 12 par. 3 of the Procedural Rules), the
Chamber had to reject the Claimant’s claim relating to the compensation for
breach of contract as for the salaries as of 1 January until 31 December 2015.
28. In this respect, the Chamber pointed out that at the time of the termination of
the employment contract, the contract would run for another 8 months.
Consequently, the Chamber concluded that the remaining value of the contract
until the regular expiry of the contract amounted to USD 154,000 and that such
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amount shall serve as the basis for the final determination of the amount of
compensation for breach of contract.
29. In continuation, the DRC verified as to whether the Claimant had signed an
employment contract with another club during the relevant period of time, by
means of which he would have been enabled to reduce his loss of income.
According to the constant practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, such
remuneration under a new employment contract shall be taken into account in
the calculation of the amount of compensation for breach of contract in
connection with the player’s general obligation to mitigate his damages.
30. The Chamber noted that the Claimant did not sign any other employment
contract.
31. Consequently, on account of all of the above-mentioned considerations and the
specificities of the case at hand, the Chamber decided that the Respondent must
pay the amount of USD 154,000 to the Claimant, which was to be considered a
reasonable and justified amount of compensation for breach of contract in the
matter at hand.
32. In addition, taking into account the Claimant’s request as well as the constant
practice of the Dispute Resolution Chamber in this regard, the Chamber decided
that the Respondent must pay to the Claimant interest of 5% p.a. on the
amount of compensation as of the date on which the claim was lodged, i.e. 22
January 2015 until the date of effective payment.
33. Moreover, the Dispute Resolution Chamber decided to reject the Claimant’s
request pertaining to legal costs in accordance with art. 18 par. 4 of the
Procedural Rules and the Chamber’s respective longstanding jurisprudence in
this regard.
34. The Dispute Resolution Chamber concluded its deliberations in the present
matter by establishing that any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
III. Decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
1.
The claim of the Claimant, Player A, is partially accepted.
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2.
The Respondent, Club C, has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from
the date of notification of this decision, outstanding remuneration in the
amount of USD 77,000 plus 5% interest p.a. until the date of effective payment
as follows:
a. 5% p.a. as of 1 February 2014 on the amount of USD 50,000;
b. 5% p.a. as of 11 February 2014 on the amount of USD 6,750;
c. 5% p.a. as of 11 March 2014 on the amount of USD 6,750;
d. 5% p.a. as of 11 April 2014 on the amount of USD 6,750;
e. 5% p.a. as of 11 May 2014 on the amount of USD 6,750.
3.
The Respondent has to pay to the Claimant, within 30 days as from the date
of notification of this decision, compensation for breach of contract in the
amount of USD 154,000 plus 5% interest p.a. on said amount as from 22 January
2015 until the date of effective payment.
4.
In the event that the aforementioned sums plus interest are not paid within the
stated time limits, the present matter shall be submitted, upon request, to FIFA’s
Disciplinary Committee for consideration and a formal decision.
5.
Any further claim lodged by the Claimant is rejected.
6.
The Claimant is directed to inform the Respondent immediately and directly of
the account number to which the remittances are to be made and to notify the
Dispute Resolution Chamber of every payment received.
Player A, country B / Club C, country D
14/15
*****
Note relating to the motivated decision (legal remedy):
According to art. 67 par. 1 of the FIFA Statutes, this decision may be appealed
against before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The statement of appeal
must be sent to the CAS directly within 21 days of receipt of notification of this
decision and shall contain all the elements in accordance with point 2 of the
directives issued by the CAS, a copy of which we enclose hereto. Within another 10
days following the expiry of the time limit for filing the statement of appeal, the
appellant shall file a brief stating the facts and legal arguments giving rise to the
appeal with the CAS (cf. point 4 of the directives).
The full address and contact numbers of the CAS are the following:
Court of Arbitration for Sport
Avenue de Beaumont 2
1012 Lausanne
Switzerland
Tel: +41 21 613 50 00
Fax: +41 21 613 50 01
e-mail: [email protected]
www.tas-cas.org
For the Dispute Resolution Chamber:
Marco Villiger
Deputy Secretary General
Encl. CAS directives
Player A, country B / Club C, country D
15/15